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Professor J. B. AmxEs, in a paper on the subject of the
Tilden Will Case,' calls in question the rule known as that
of Morice z. The Bishop of Durham.'
Certainly it will be a thing to be remarked if this criticism is wdl taken : if either on the broadest principles upon
which any system of jurisprudence can be founded or upon
the most narrow of technical rules the rule of that case can
be varied.
The rule is this. A devise in trust for objects entirely
uncertain, so that no one can possibly insist on the application of the fund, is void. An exception to this rule is to
be noted when the objects are charities. The reason for
the rule, it will be observed, has not been alluded to.
Now it is to be noticed that the case was heard and decided by two of the most competent lawyers England ever
produced, Sir WILLIAM GRANT and Lord ELDON. It is
also a fact most worthy to be noted for the present purpose,
that the rule was admitted to exist by all the counsel of all
the parties.
A few words on the exception. The existence of the
exception in case of charities is not disputed in the English law nor in America-even where that exception is declared not to be in force; for invariably the refusal to be
governed by the exception is based on the assumption that
it owed its existence to the statute of 43 Eliz. This view
-that the validity of a gift for a mere charitable use without a defined purpose or object is dependent on that statute
and was, in fact, created by it-is (as Mr. BINNEY said in
his argument in Vidal v. Girard) a misstatement of matter
offact, not of law or reason ; and it might as well and with
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as much truth be said that trusts for accumulation were
never restricted till the Thelluson Act.
The rule that makes charities an exception, whatever
be its origin, is no more than this: any charitable intention, whether described or undefined, is a terson capable of
taking by deed or will, and always was so by the law of
England. The origin of the rule is a matter of speculative
law. It is attributed by Mr. BINNEY in his argument to
the teaching of St. PAUL that had found its way from the
servant's hall to the palace. And there is a passage strikingly conformnatory of this suggestion in DR CHAMPIGNY'S
"Les Antonins."' It may be that the doctrine of the Roman law respecting things dedicated had some effect in producing the rule that a gift for a charitable purpose is as
completely valid as a gift to a living person for his own use.
Whatever its origin, it is quite certain as a matter of fact,
not as matter of opinion, that this rule has been the common law of England from all time. That is, it has been a
rule of property having no dependence on any statute or any
prerogative, but is, on principle, identical with the rule
that recognizes the right of any beneficiary, whether by
deed or will, whether by direct gift or by the intervention
of a trustee.
It is obvious that this rule has nothing to do with that
which must govern when there is a trust declared but no
object named or described. Probably no one will dispute
that such a trust is void in the sense that it enures to the
benefit of the person creating it if the property has effectually passed from him. In case of a will, it is void precisely
as a devise in trust for a named person is a nullity if that
person is not living at the time the will becomes operative.
The debatable point is then reduced to the case of a clear
trust-that is, a disposition which by its terms excludes all
beneficial interest in the grantee or devisee, and yet fails to
describe the purpose in such a manner as to enable a Court
to enforce it.
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There are two distinct classes of trusts of this character. Professor A.NEs combines them as if they constituted but one, aid thus finds a ground for his doubt as to
the rule itself. The'first class is that in which the objects
are absolutely uncertain, and can only be made certain by
the choice of another. Miorice v. Bishop of Durham was
of this kind. Any object of benevolence was within the
terms of the trust. The effect of the rule recognized in
this case--recognized, I say, not decided; not argued; but
assumed and conceded-is that when the discretion of some
one is essential to create a beneficial right, and the trustee
is precluded from exercising it for his own benefit, the
devise is void unless the object is charitable. No one could
possibly doubt that a resulting trust would arise had this
been a deed ; and the reason seems to be quite clear. The
beneficial interest is the real one-the trustee is but a
medium ; the effect of naming a trustee is to exclude any
such interest vesting in or being acquired by him. It is
clear that if the authority to name the beneficiaries were
valid, the beneficial estate and the actual ownership would
vest in the heir till the power was exercised. The result
would be that, at least during the life of the trustee, the
heir might be the owner and subject to all the duties of
owner, but liable at the will of the trustee to be deprived
of the property, possibly made liable to account, and practically incapable of exercising any incident of ownership.
Such a rule of property would be utterly fantastic and
absurd. It may well be that the same rule which compels
all estates within a limited period to become one of the two
inheritable estates, estates tail or in fee simple, or the rule
that forbids the grant of a right of way in gross, is another
expression of the reason for making such devises void.
Certain it is, however, that such dispositions have always
been held to be void. " Void for uncertainty" is the rule,
or reason applied to extinguish them.
The other class of cases (which is treated as belonging
to the same category as those above discussed), are those in
which the object or purpose is definite, but there is no
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Person to be benefited-as, for instance, to erect a monument, to provide for a favorite animal, etc. It is supposed
that because there is no beneficiary to enforce the trust
they are within the rule. Is not this mistaking the meaning of the language that was used by Sir WILLIAM GRANT,
or, at least, misapplying it? There must be (he said)
somebody in whose favor the Court can decree performance.
Did he mean there must be a personal beneficiary who can
litigate? This would vitiate the most reasonable of testamentary provisions-such as those for the expenses of interment, or the placing of a stone to mark the spot. Sir
WILLIAm GRANT was referring to the quality of uncertainty
only, and he included within that all cases which could
only be made certain by a selection of objects at the option
of the devisee, and where no selection could be compelled.
It would be most unfair to attribute an intention to vitiate
trusts for specific objects, if perchance there was no machinery of law that could compel tihe execution. But there is
no want of such machinery. The residuary legatee or the
next of kin are entitled to the unexpended fund and can
thus enforce the trust.
The rule itself, however, is of great importance and
value; it applies only where there is a gift to persons or
objects that cannot be ascertained at the time at which the
grant, whether by deed or bill, must take effect to deprive
the grantor or his heir of all beneficial interest in the
property.
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